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unimpressive as a guidepost to statutory meaning. The crucial language
cited by the court is capable of differing interpretations. A leading
commentator, in rejecting the committee reports, explains that "as essays
in statutory construction, they do not commend themselves.' 10 2  In
contrast to its indulgent attitude towards the ambiguities that abound in
the committee report, the court exhibited an unnecessarily rigid ap-
proach to the statutory language itself. Maritime employment includes
those tasks that take place over navigable waters. The coverage provi-
sions can be fairly read to encompass all employment-related injuries that
occur within the Act's territorial limits. At the very least, maritime
employment must include all employees engaged in the overall process
of loading and unloading vessels. An affirmation of the Benefits Re-
view Board in these three cases would come closer to accomplishing the
congressional intention of creating a modem, fair and workable long-
shoremen's compensation scheme.
BRIAN A. POWERS
Civil Procedure-Cutts v. Casey Extended to Summary
Judgment
[PROLOGUE
As this Note went to press, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held
in Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E.2d 392 (1976), that summary judg-
ment may be granted for the party with the trial burden of proof even when
he carries that burden, at least in part, with his own affidavits. Cutts v.
Casey was expressly rejected as not controlling since it involved a directed
verdict motion upon conflicting evidence on a strenuously contested issue of
fact.
In an excellent analysis that appears to adopt the federal construction,
Chief Justice Sharp concluded that a movant with the trial burden of proof
is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of his own affidavits when:
(1) there are only latent doubts concerning the credibility of his affidavits;
(2) the non-movant has failed to introduce any materials which support his
opposition to the motion or which point to specific areas of contradiction or
impeachment in the movant's materials and the non-movant has failed to
utilize rule 56(0; and (3) summary judgment is otherwise appropriate-
102. GiLMoRE & BLACK, supra note 5, § 6-51, at 450.
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that is, the movant must succeed on the basis of his own materials. The
Chief Justice clearly articulated that to succeed on his own materials the mov-
ant must show: (1) that there are no genuine issues of material fact; (2)
that there are no gaps in his proof; (3) that no inferences inconsistent with
his recovery arise from his evidence; and (4) that there is no standard that
must be applied to the facts by a jury. With equal clarity she noted that
summary judgment must be denied if the movant's affiants are inherently
incredible, if the circumstances are suspect, or if the need for cross-examina-
tion appears. Thus, she concluded that when a movant's only materials were
his own affidavits, ordinarily he will not be able to meet the above standards.
However, interest in the outcome of the case on the part of an affiant, by
itself, was said to raise only latent doubts as to his credibility which do not
preclude summary judgment.
Despite the Kidd opinion we feel that this Note warrants publication
for several reasons. First, it provides a vehicle by which the North Carolina
Law Review can timely disseminate information concerning the important
Kidd decision. Second, this note presents arguments that the pronouncement
in Cutts is obiter dictum. There is some language in the Kidd decision that
supports these arguments. In light of the Kidd decision, these arguments
may prove particularly useful. Additionally the court in Kidd expressly re-
jected the argument that the constitutional right to jury trial compelled the
preclusion of summary judgment for the movant with the trial burden of
proof. A similar argument was the basis of the Cutts rationale. Thus the
court in Kidd rejected the argument it thought persuasive in Cutts. This
express rejection certainly weakens Cutts even as it applies to directed ver-
dict cases and supports the conclusion of this note that the Cutts rule may be
only dictum. Third, the policy arguments for not applying the Cutts decision
to summary judgment cases presented in this note are quite similar to those
expressed by the court in Kidd. Finally, we think this Note, though some-
what pre-empted, will provide a useful research tool when read in conjunction
with the Kidd decision.
THm BOARD OF EDITORS]
When the North Carolina Supreme Court decided Cuts v. Casey,'
the decision was met with a less than favorable reaction.2  Cutts denies
the availability of a motion for directed verdict to the party with the
burden of proof when his right to recover depends upon the credibility
of his witnesses.' Some critics of this opinion, like Jeremiah predicting
1. 278 N.C. 390, 180 S.E.2d 297 (1971).
2. See, e.g., Louis, A Survey of Decisions Under the New North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure, 50 N.C.L REv. 729, 746-54 (1972); Comment, Directing the Verdict
in Favor of the Party with the Burden of Proof, 50 N.C.L REV. 843, 84.7-52 (1972).
3. 278 N.C. at 417, 180 S.E.2d at 311. The rationale for this decision was that
to direct a verdict based on testimonial evidence for the party with the burden of proof
would violate the non-movants constitutional right to jury trial. Id. at 417-18, 180
1976]
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doom to the peoples of Judah, prophesied that the decision not only
forced an unintended and restrictive interpretation on the use of the
directed verdict, but also that its application to summary judgment
motions would be compelled by force of logic.4 It appears that such
things have come to pass. In Shearin v. National Indemnity Co., the
North Carolina Court of Appeals reluctantly concluded that the Su-
S.E.2d at 311. The constitutional provision relied upon provides: "In all controversies
at law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best securities
of the rights of the people, and shall remain sacred and inviolable." N.C. CONST. art.
I, § 25. From this statement of constitutional policy, it was concluded by the Cutts
majority that the presentation of testimonial evidence raises an issue of credibility that
must be submitted to the jury. 278 N.C. at 417, 180 S.E.2d at 311. This conclusion
is clearly at odds with federal and most state precedent. See cases cited by Huskins,
J., concurring, id. at 427, 180 S.E.2d at 319. See also Comment, 50 N.C.L. Rnv., supra
note 2, at 848 & n.29. Generally, the federal courts will allow a directed verdict based
upon testimonial evidence for the party with the burden of proof if that evidence is un-
contradicted, unimpeached, and if no conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom.
5A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAMcCE 50.02[1], at 2318-19 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as MOORE]. Under this approach, when a judge directs a verdict based upon such
evidence, he has not deprived the non-movant of his right to jury trial because the pre-
liminary question---"Is there a genuine issue of fact for the jury?"-is a question of law
for the judge that may be decided against the non-movant. See 2 A. McINTosH, NORTH
CAROLINA PRAcricE AND PRGOCEDURE § 1488.20 (Phillips Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as Phillips]. The majority in Cutts distinguished this precedent by relying upon N.C.R.
Civ. P. 51(a), North Carolina's "no comment" statute, which forbids a judge from
commenting on the sufficiency of the evidence during his charge to the jury. It
has been pervasively argued that this reliance was neither appropriate nor compelled.
See 278 N.C. at 427, 180 S.E.2d at 319 (Huskins, J., concurring); Phillips § 1488.20;
authoritites cited note 2 supra.
This note proceeds upon the preliminary conclusion that the Cutts decision was un-
fortunate for two reasons. First, under Cutts, an entire class of potential movants
(those with the burden of proof who must rely upon testimonial evidence) are denied
access to the directed verdict procedure. Thus, even if the non-movant has presented
no evidence and regardless of the strength of the movant's case, the issues created by
denials in the pleadings must be submitted to a jury if the movant's right to recover de-
pends upon the credibility of his witnesses. Second, to the extent that the Cutts holding
is extended to summary judgment, the primary purpose of that procedure-to preview
the evidence so that a trial may be avoided if there is no genuine issue of material fact
-is frustrated. If the movant bears his burden of proof with testimonial evidence (affi-
davits), there is no compulsion on the non-movant to come forward with materials of
his own since, under Cutts, summary judgment cannot be entered against him on the
basis of the movant's testimonial evidence. If he does not come forward, it is impossible
for a judge to predetermine if the non-movant can present triable issues of fact. This
is clearly at odds with the language of rule 56(e). See note 38 infra.
During these days of crowded dockets it seems inappropriate to deny the availabil-
ity of two procedures and to frustrate their clear purpose of promoting judicial economy
for less than compelling reasons. Since the constitutional infirmity propounded in Cutts
has been rejected by the vast majority of jurisdictions using virtually identical procedural
rules, and since the factor used by the Cutts majority to distinguish this precedent is
less than persuasive, until overruled, Cutts should be limited. This note proceeds upon
that premise.
4. E.g., Cutts v. Casey, 278 N.C. 390, 426-27, 180 S.E.2d 297, 321 (1971) (Hus-
kins, J., concurring); Louis, supra note 2, at 749 & nn.132-33.
5. 27 N.C App. 88, 218 S.E.2d 207 (1975).
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preme Court's reasoning in Cutts applied to summary judgment
motions.,
In Shearin plaintiff-insured sought to recover from defendant-
insurer for accidental damage to his airplane. The insurer denied
liability on two grounds. First, it alleged that at the time of the accident
the airplane was not being used for a "use" covered in the policy.
7
Second, it alleged that the aircraft was not being operated by a "quali-
fied" pilot as that term was defined in the policy.8 Plaintiff's answers to
interrogatories issued by defendant tended to show that at the time the
airplane was damaged, it was being used by a friend of plaintiff who
was receiving flight instruction from a certified instructor.9 On the
basis of the pleadings and plaintiff's answers to the interrogatories,
defendant moved for summary judgment.' 0
Plaintiff responded with an affidavit by his friend, an affidavit by
the flight instructor and two affidavits of his own. These materials
tended to show that plaintiff had made his airplane available at no
charge so that his friend could get flight instruction; that the instructor
was certified and was a "qualified" pilot under the policy definitions;
and that although his friend was operating the plane from the pilot's
chair, the instructor had "continuous ready access to a set of controls
during the entire flight . . . ."' On the basis of these affidavits
plaintiff made a cross-motion for summary judgment to which defend-
ant did not respond.
The trial judge determined that there was no genuine issue of
material fact and concluded as a matter of law that the "use" in question
was covered by the policy and that the airplane was being operated by a
6. Id. at 91-92, 218 S.E.2d at 210.
7. Insurer admitted in its answer that it had issued an accident policy to plaintiff
and that the policy was in effect at the time of the mishap. Its defenses were defini-
tional in nature. Id. at 88, 218 S.E.2d at 208.
8. Id. Item six of the Policy Declarations provided that the airplane would be
used for "[pleasure and fb]usiness." This was defined as "[plersonal and [pileasure
use and use in direct connection with the [insured's business, excluding any operation
for which a charge is made." "Qualified [plilot" as defined in the policy referred to
Federal Aviation Administration certifications and ratings. Id. In addition, the policy
provided that it did not apply to any loss occurring while the airplane was being oper-
ated by a student-pilot unless the student was under the direct supervision of a certified
instructor. Id. at 89, 218 S.E.2d at 208.
9. Id. at 89, 218 S.E.2d at 208.
10. Summary judgment is authorized for either "claimant" or "defending party"
under N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(a) & (b). All references in this Note to specific rules
of civil procedure will be, unless otherwise indicated, to the North Carolina rules.
11. 27 N.C. App. at 90, 218 S.E.2d at 209.
1976]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
"qualified" pilot.12  Plaintiff's summary judgment motion was granted
on the issue of liability and a trial on the issue of damages was
ordered.13 The defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals clearly articulated the narrow issue:
"[W]hether . . .a summary judgment may be granted in favor of the
party having the burden of proof when his right to recover depends
upon the credibility of his witnesses." The holding is equally clear: "On
authority of Cutts v. Casey, we conclude that the answer is NO."
14
Judge Parker, writing for the majority,' 5 was unable "to see why the
principle announced in Cutts v. Casey [did] not apply with at least
equal force when the question is presented by a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56."1-6 Judge Vaughn, in dissent, acknowledged
that Cutts was controlling precedent in directed verdict cases, but con-
cluded that since a summary judgment motion comes at a different
"stage" of a. proceeding, different responsibilities could be placed on
the parties. 7 Therefore, failure to meet the responsibilities imposed at
one stage could result in a party losing "the shield that would otherwise
be available for the next [stage]."' s
Before considering the import of the Shearin decision, it is neces-
sary to examine briefly the development and application of summary
judgment, a procedure new to North Carolina.'" Summary judgment
represents the most drastic change in our procedural system wrought by
the new rules.20  The procedure outlined in rule 56 is clearly available
to any party and is not limited in its application to any particular type of
action.2 ' Its purpose is to pierce the allegations of the pleadings and to
12. Id. at 91, 218 S.E.2d at 209. Although the court of appeals reversed the trial
judge on the basis of Cutts, both the majority opinion and the dissent concluded that,
but for Cutts, the trial judge's conclusions of law were correct. Id. at 91-93, 218 S.E.2d
at 210-11.
13. Rule 56(c) specifically allows summary judgment on the issue of liability even
though a genuine issue exists as to the amount of damages. See note 29 infra.
14. 27 N.C. App. at 91, 218 S.E.2d at 209, 210 (citation omitted).
15. Britt, J., concurred without opinion. Vaughn, J., dissented. Id. at 92, 218
S.E.2d at 210.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 93, 218 S.E.2d at 210-11.
18. Id.
19. W. SHUFORD, NoRTH CAROLINA CIVIL PR.AcTIcE AND PROCmumR § 56-2 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as SHuFoRD]. Prior procedure did allow certain issues of fact raised
by the pleadings to be stricken if they were irrelevant or redundant, if a "sham" defense
was raised, or if an answer, reply or demurrer was "frivolous." Where these procedures
did not apply, any issue raised by the pleadings required a trial. Id.
20. SHuFoRD, supra note 19, § 56-3, at 467.
21. E.g., McNair v. Boyette, 282 N.C. 230, 234, 192 S.E.2d 457, 460 (1972); Kes-
sing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 533, 180 S.E.2d 823, 829 (1971); Prid-
gen v. Hughes, 9 N.C. App. 635, 638, 177 S.E.2d 425, 426 (1970).
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determine if there are any issues of material fact for trial. 2 If no such
issue exists, the court can dispose of a case on the merits by applying the
appropriate law without incurring the cost or delay of further proceed-
ings.
While North Carolina practitioners have utilized summary judg-
ment extensively,23 the state courts have considered it a drastic remedy
that should be granted sparingly.24 Great pains have been taken by the
appellate courts to describe the situations in which summary judgment is
not appropriate. It is absolutely clear that the trial judge hearing the
motion is not to decide issues of fact.25 It is equally clear that although
a judge may have before him many materials,"6 and may even hear oral
testimony, 27 he is not to let the hearing develop into a "trial.)
28
Rule 56 contains a statement of the standard that must be met
before summary judgment can be granted. Only when the allowable
materials "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
22. E.g., Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 464, 186 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1972); cf.
cases cited note 21 supra.
23. It has been suggested that more summary judgment motions have been the sub-
ject of appeal than any other procedure available under the new rule. SHuroRD, supra
note 19, § 56-3, at 467.
24. E.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 282 N.C.
44, 51, 191 S.E.2d 683, 688 (1972); Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513,
518, 186 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1972).
25. E.g., Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, P.A., 286 N.C. 24, 29, 209 S.E.2d 795, 798
(1974); Houck v. Overcash, 282 N.C. 623, 627, 193 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1973); Singleton
v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 464, 186 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1972). Some North Carolina
judges persist in listing "findings of fact" in their summary judgment orders. Although
this practice is not appropriate, it does not constitute reversible error if the judge did
not decide issues of material fact and only listed stipulated or admitted facts and conclu-
sions of law. See Wall v. Wall, 24 N.C. App. 725, 729, 212 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1975).
26. Rule 56(c) specifically -names pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, affidavits, and admissions on file as appropriate materials. See note 29 infra.
However, the scope of available materials is broader. In addition to the materials listed
in rule 56(c), the court can consider admissions in the pleadings and admissions on file,
whether obtained under rule 36 or otherwise, and any other material which would be
admissible in evidence or of which judicial notice may be taken. E.g., Kessing v. Na-
tional Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 533, 180 S.E.2d 823, 829 (1971). Oral testimony
is also available. See note 27 infra. In addition, stipulations of fact are considered as
admissions and any presumptions that would be available at trial can be considered.
Page v. Sloan, 281 N.C. 697, 705, 190 S.E.2d 189, 194 (1972) (stipulations of fact);
Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 518, 186 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1972) (pre-
sumptions).
27. Oral testimony, by virtue of rule 43(e), can be heard at a summary judgment
hearing. However, such testimony should be used sparingly to prevent the hearing from
developing into a "trial" to determine if a trial is necessary. Chandler v. Cleveland Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 24 N.C. App. 455, 461, 211 S.E.2d 484, 489 (1975); Walton v. Meir,
14 N.C. App. 183, 188-89, 188 S.E.2d 56, 60 (1972).
28. See note 27 supra.
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that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law...- is
summary judgment appropriate. Interpreting this statutory standard,
North Carolina courts have stated that an issue is "material" if the facts
alleged constitute a legal defense, or are of such a nature as to affect the
result of the action, or if the resolution of the issue is so essential that the
party against whom it is resolved cannot prevail.30 Similarly, a "genu-
ine issue" has been defined as one that can be supported by substantial
evidence.3" Thus neither a material issue that cannot be supported by
substantial evidence nor an issue of immaterial fact will preclude sum-
mary judgment. 32  In applying these standards, directed verdict has
developed into somewhat of a touchstone. It has been repeatedly stated
that summary judgment is appropriate when only legal issues are in-
volved and when a party would be entitled to a directed verdict at trial.1
3
These interpretations of rule 56 have not caused substantial contro-
versy. The difficult task for any court is application of the evidentiary
standards that each party must meet either to be entitled to or to defeat a
motion for summary judgment. Consistent with the present interpreta-
tion of the equivalent federal rule,3 4 the burden in North Carolina is on
the movant to establish the lack of a triable issue of material fact,
regardless of which party bears the burden of proof at trial. 3 General-
29. Rule 56(c) states in full:
Motion and proceedings thereon.-The motion shall be served at least 10
days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in char-
acter, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. Summary judgment, when ap-
propriate, may be rendered against the moving party.
30. E.g., Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, P.A., 286 N.C. 24, 29, 209 S.E.2d 795, 798
(1974); Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 518, 186 S.E.2d 897, 901
(1972).
31. E.g., cases cited note 30 supra.
32. E.g., Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 534, 180 S.E.2d 823,
830 (1971).
33. Long v. Long, 15 N.C. App. 525, 526-27, 190 S.E.2d 415, 416-17 (1972);
Haithcock v. Chimney Rock Co., 10 N.C. App. 696, 698-99, 179 S.E.2d 865, 867
(1971).
34. There are four minor differences between the North Carolina rule and the fed-
eral rule. SHUFORD, supra note 19, § 56-1, at 466-67. For discussion of the present fed-
eral interpretation see Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis,
83 YALE L.J. 745, 748 & n.13.
35. E.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 282 N.C.
44, 51, 191 S.E.2d 683, 688 (1972); Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204, 206, 210
S.E.2d 289, 291 (1974).
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ly, this burden will be met by proving the non-existence of an essential
element of the opposing party's claim or by showing through discovery
that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support one of the
essential elements of his claim. 6 To determine whether this burden has
been met, the court views the record in the light most favorable to the
non-movant, accepts his evidence as true and regards his papers indul-
gently. 7  If the movant meets this initial burden, rule 56(e) specifically
provides that unless the non-movant produces specific facts showing the
existence of a triable issue, the movant is entitled to summary judg-
ment.3
8
Applying these standards to the Shearin facts, both the trial court
and the court of appeals believed that plaintiff had met his burden.39
They were equally in agreement that defendant had failed to set forth
specific facts showing the existence of a triable issue. The court of
appeals concluded: but for Cutts v. Casey, summary judgment was
appropriate for the plaintiff.40 Given this conclusion, it is unfortunate
that the court of appeals did not take the opportunity in Shearin to
distinguish Cutts.
There were several options available to the court of appeals. The
majority opinion indicates that the court felt compelled to apply the
36. Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, P.A., 286 N.C. 24, 29, 209 S.E.2d 795, 798
(1974).
37. E.g., Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, P.A., 286 N.C. 24, 29, 209 S.E.2d 795, 798
(1974); Hall v. Funderburk, 23 N.C. App. 214, 216, 208 S.E.2d 402, 403 (1974). In
addition, it is often said that the movant's papers will be closely scrutinized. Id.
38. Rule 56(e) provides in part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against him.
North Carolina courts have interpreted this provision to mean that if the movant's
materials are not sufficient, summary judgment in his favor is not "appropriate" and
must be denied even if the non-movant does not respond at all. Thus it has been held
that the non-movant does not incur the burden of coming forward with evidence of a
triable issue until the movant produces evidence of the necessary certitude which negates
the non-movant's claim in its entirety. Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204, 206,
210 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1974); see Tolbert v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 22 N.C.
App. 491, 494, 206 S.E.2d 816, 817 (1974).
39. 27 N.C. App. at 91-92, 218 S.E.2d at 210.
40. Id. The court's reliance on Cutts appears justified. There, as in Shearin, the
movant with the burden of proof met that burden with testimonial evidence. Credibil-
ity conceivably could be questioned at trial. Thus the Cutts conclusion that credibility
of witnesses is for the jury, combined with the substantial precedent equating the tests
for the two motions, provides some justification for the extension of the Cutts reasoning
to summary judgment proceedings.
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Cutts reasoning to the Shearin facts even though it was unanimous in its
opinion that summary judgment was proper.4 If stare decisis was the
force behind that compulsion, the court of appeals need not have yielded
so readily. Though the doctrine of stare decisis is "fully established" in
North Carolina, 42 it was not necessarily applicable in Shearin for two
reasons. First, while the North Carolina Supreme Court has spoken to
the credibility question in relation to directed verdict motions, there has
been no decision in that court applying the Cutts rationale to summary
judgment cases. By refusing to apply the Cutts doctrine to the Shearin
facts, the court of appeals would not be committing the verboten act of
overruling a supreme court decision since there is little factual similarity
between the two cases." In addition, it must be remembered that
Shearin and Cutts, cases of statutory interpretation, deal with different
statutes. Though the similarity of the motions authorized by the two
statutes is undeniable," there are technical differences upon which a
court could reasonably rely in distinguishing them. 45  Second, at least
theoretically, the pronouncement in Cutts that credibility is always for
the jury can be considered obiter dicta." Justice Sharp, in the Cutts
41. Id.
42. Williamson v. Rabon, 177 N.C. 302, 305, 98 S.E. 830, 831 (1919); cf. Bulova
Watch Co. v. Brand Distributors, 285 N.C. 467, 472-73, 206 S.E.2d 141, 145 (1974).
43. Stare decisis is a doctrine based on similarity of fact patterns. Cf. Dennis v.
City of Albemarle, 243 N.C. 221, 223, 90 S.E.2d 532, 533 (1955). Cutts, an action
to try title to land, has little in common with Shearin, an action to recover under an
insurance contract.
44. See text accompanying note 33 supra. The similarity is such that it has led
one commentator to suggest that, analytically, the motions are identical. Louis, supra
note 2, at 749 & nn.132-33.
45. Distinction at this level of analysis is not difficult since stare decisis is a doc-
trine based on recurring fact patterns. See note 43 supra. Several differences between
the two motions are apparent. First, they appear at different stages of a proceeding.
As a result, the materials a judge considers when ruling on a summary judgment motion
are not "evidence" as they are in a directed verdict setting, but are "evidence of evi-
dence." In addition, granting a summary judgment can avoid a needless trial while
granting a directed verdict cannot. Second, there are differences in the language of the
two rules upon which a distinction could be forced. Although rule 50 is less than ambig-
uous in its references to who may move for directed verdict, rule 56(a) specifically
provides for a summary judgment for a "party seeking to recover upon a claim, counter-
claim, or crossclaim . . . ." In the normal situation such a party will bear the burden
of proof at trial. For a comparison of the language of the two rules see Cutts v. Casey,
278 N.C. 390, 425-26, 180 S.E.2d 287, 320-21 (1971) (Huskins, J., concurring). These
"technical differences," while perhaps unacceptable as distinctions upon which to allow
a summary judgment for the party hearing the burden of proof with testimonial evidence,
certainly are substantial enough to reject Cutts as controlling in summary judgment
cases. See generally Louis, supra note 2, at 749 & nn.132-33.
46. Statements in the text of a judicial opinion unnecessary to the determination
of the case have to be regarded as obiter dicta. Cf. Washburn v. Washburn, 234 N.C.
370, 373, 67 S.E.2d 264, 266 (1951).
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majority opinion, noted that granting summary judgment was doubly
error since the movant's evidence was contradicted. 47 It can be argued
that this factor was dispositive of the case.48  If it was dispositive, then
the statement in Cutts concerning the movant with the burden of proof
and credibility must be dictum. The credence of this argument is en-
hanced by an important qualification in the Cutts opinion; despite the
pronouncement that credibility is always for the jury, Chief Justice
Sharp conceded that there may be a few situations in which credibility as
a matter of law seems compelled.49 In light of this equivocation, it
would not be unreasonable to confine Cutts to its own facts for stare
decisis purposes. Certainly it should not be extended to control a
different statute. And certainly any decision to extend it at all should
not be made by an intermediate court that finds the extension contrary
to the clear language of the statute. 0
If the court of appeals was not compelled to apply the Cutts
rationale to summary judgment by the doctrine of stare decisis, what was
the basis for its decision to do so? It is submitted that the court was
47. 278 N.C. at 422, 180 S.E.2d at 314. Even under the more liberal federal inter-
pretation of directed verdict for the party with the burden of proof, the motion must
be denied if the movant's testimonial evidence is contradicted or impeached. 5A
MoORE, supra note 3, 50.02[l], at 2318-19 (2d ed. 1975). North Carolini case law is
consistent with this interpretation. See cases cited notes 55-56 infra.
48. See note 47 supra. An additional dispositive factor, not recognized by the
court, was that the plaintiff in Cutts apparently did not move at the close of all the
evidence for a directed verdict on his own claim. Such a motion is an absolute pre-
requisite to a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under rule 50(b), the mo-
tion the trial court erroneously granted. See Louis, supra note 2, at 747 & nn.116 &
117.
49. 278 N.C. at 421, 180 S.E.2d at 314. The Cutts opinion did not elaborate upon
the situations in which credibility as a matter of law would be compelled. The federal
courts accept credibility as a matter of law when the movant's evidence is uncontra-
dicted, unimpeached, and no conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom. See note
3 supra. Dean Phillips, cited by Chief Justice Sharp in Cutts, suggests that credibility
could be accepted where the movant's evidence is entirely documentary or where it is
uncontradicted and the facts to contradict it, if they exist at all, are within the non-
movant's peculiar knowledge. Phillips, supra note 3, § 1488.20, at 26. Other jurisdic-
tions accept credibility when the non-movant "admits" facts that establish the movant's
case, when the controlling evidence is documentary and its construction is a matter of
law for the court, or when the movant's oral evidence is unimpeached and uncontra-
dicted. See Comment, 50 N.C.L. Rnv., supra note 2, at 844-48. In addition most courts
will deny directed verdict if the movant's evidence is inherently suspect by reason of
interest, internal inconsistencies, equivocation, or scientific impossibility. Id. at 849.
The negative implication from North Carolina case law is that the movant's evidence
must be from a disinterested witness whose testimony is not contradicted or impeached.
See text accompanying notes 51-54 infra.
50. The Shearin majority noted, 'Therefore, were we at liberty to give full scope
to Rule 56, we would agree with the trial court in the present case that, upon the basis
of plaintiffs uncontradicted affidavits, there is here no genuine issue as to any material
fact." 27 N.C. App. at 91, 218 S.E.2d at 210.
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misled concerning the scope of Cutts and missed the opportunity to free
summary judgment from its shadow.
One possible ground for distinction is suggested by Judge Vaughn
in his dissent. In considering the fact that rule 56 clearly contemplates
the availability of a summary judgment for any party,"1 regardless of
burdens of proof, he seemed to be raising a question as to what policy is
contravened when the movant has the burden of proof and carries that
burden with testimonial evidence. The Cutts opinion suggests that the
policy violated in directed verdict cases is the right to have a jury
observe the demeanor of the movant's witnesses and pass upon their
credibility. Even if this policy is effectuated in Cufts,52 it is still possible
to distinguish the two motions by considering the stages at which they
are available. To preserve the right to have a jury pass upon the
credibility of an adversary's witnesses, a party must file the necessary
pleadings in accordance with the statutory requirements. The proce-
dural system thus imposes a condition precedent to this "constitutional"
right r3 at the pleading stage. If preservation of the right can be
conditioned upon requiring a certain response at the pleading stage, it
follows that preservation of that right can be similarly conditioned when
an adversary moves for summary judgment.
Another possible ground for distinction lies in North Carolina
case law concerning summary judgment. Some early decisions did deal
directly with the credibility question when summary judgment was the
procedural posture of the case. Before the Cutts decision came down,
the North Carolina Court of Appeals purported to follow federal prece-
dent in reversing the grant of summary judgment when the movant's
affidavits were made by interested parties.5 4  Similar North Carolina
decisions have held that the motion is not available to a party who bears
his burden of proof with testimonial evidence when that evidence is con-
tradicted5 5 or when the knowledge of the facts is largely within the
51. See note 45 supra.
52. It is submitted that this policy does not compel or justify the Cutts result. See
note 3 supra.
53. This right is articulated in N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 25. See note 3 supra.
54. Lee v. Shor, 10 N.C. App. 231, 235, 178 S.E.2d 101, 104 (1970). The court
in Shor also suggested that a trial court should never resolve an issue of credibility. Id.
Cf. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Werner Indus., Inc., 286 N.C. 89, 98-99, 209 S.E.2d 734, 739
(1974); Shook Builders Supply Co. v. Eastern Assoc., Inc., 24 N.C. App. 533, 537, 211
S.E.2d 472, 475 (1975).
55. Cf. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Werner Indus., Inc., 286 N.C. 89, 98, 209 S.E.2d 734,
739 (1974); Reavis v. Campbell, 27 N.C. App. 231, 236, 218 S.E.2d 873, 876 (1975).
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movant's control.56 These holdings are consistent with federal prece-
dent.57 It is contended that in Shearin, the court of appeals bolted from
this established line of cases which follows federal precedent when it
applied the Cutts reasoning to a summary judgment case.5 s
The Shearin departure from North Carolina and federal summary
judgment precedent even stands in marked contrast with other post-
Cutts decisions by the court of appeals. In Brooks v. Smith 9 the
defendant successfully supported his summary judgment motion with
the affidavit of an eyewitness. The court found that the "deposition
clearly establishe[d] contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
which was the proximate cause of his injuries." '  This unimpeached
and uncontradicted affidavit of a disinterested witness carried the de-
fendant's burden as movant upon an issue for which he would have the
burden of proof at trial. Since the plaintiff did not respond to defend-
ant's motion, the court of appeals held that summary judgment was
proper."' Similarly, in Bogle v. Duke Power Co.62 the same result was
reached in a wrongful death action. In that case the defendant carried
his burden as movant for summary judgment with the affidavit of a
disinterested witness. The affidavit clearly showed that plaintiff's de-
ceased was contributorily negligent.6 3  Since plaintiff did not respond to
these materials, the court of appeals held that summary judgment prop-
erly was granted against her.
From these two cases it can be concluded that the court of appeals
does not feel compelled to apply the Cutts reasoning to all summary
judgment cases in which the movant carries his trial burden with testi-
monial evidence. It is submitted that in Shearin the court was not
56. Cf. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Wemer Indus., Inc., 286 N.C. 88, 98-99, 209 S.E.2d
734, 739 (1974); Lee v. Shor, 10 N.C. App. 231, 235-36, 178 S.E.2d 101, 104 (1970).
57. See 10 C. WPIjr & A. MILLR, ,FEDERAL PRACTICE AN]) PRocXDuRE § 2726,
at 521-24 (1913); notes 3 &49 supra.
58. It is difficult to imagine why these limitations on the availability of summary
judgment to the party who bears his burden of proof with testimonial evidence were ever
articulated if Cutts were controlling.
59. 27 N.C. App. 223, 218 S.E.2d 489 (1975).
60. Id. at 226, 218 S.E.2d at 491.
61. Id. at 227, 218 S.E.2d at 491-92.
62. 27 N.C. App. 318, 219 S.E.2d 308 (1975).
63. Id. at 322, 219 S.E.2d at 311. It should be noted that in Bogle, an alternative
ground for the grant of defendant's motion was "no negligence," an issue upon which
defendant did not bear the trial burden of proof. Id. This was pointed out by Parker,
J., who concurred in the result since defendant had shown that plaintiff could not prove
negligence. However, he rejected contributory negligence as an alternative ground for
granting defendant's summary judgment since "Etihe credibility of defendant's witness
is involved." Id. at 323, 219 S.E.2d at 311.
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compelled to do so by the doctrine of stare decisis. It also appears that
the court missed the opportunity to limit the Cutts opinion to its own
facts as obiter dictum. Also present and missed was the opportunity to
narrow its scope by assigning credibility as a matter of law in Shearin or
at least recognizing the availability of that action on other facts.
6"
Finally, available to and never mentioned by the majority were several
possible distinctions between the two motions. 65
In light of Brooks and Bogle, it is difficult to evaluate the signifi-
cance of the Shearin holding. The danger in the court's blind applica-
tion of Cutts is that Shearin will become the same rigid touchstone in
summary judgment cases that Cutts has become in directed verdict
cases. Unfortunately, it appears that this process has already begun."
CARL N. PATTERSON, JR.
Construction Lending-General Contractor v. Lender
Any number of complex legal relationships may be generated by a
building construction project.' Even within the framework of an ordi-
nary situation with standard contracts, small factual variations can
produce very different legal consequences. The relationship between
64. Since Shearin was basically a case of contract interpretation, granting summary
judgment for plaintiff seems appropriate. See note 49 supra. However, in Shearin the
option was certainly available to deny plaintiff's summary judgment motion since two
of his affiants (the plaintiff and his friend) were interested parties. See text accom-
panying note 11 supra.
65. See text accompanying notes 44-58 supra. One final distinction is particularly
troublesome. The impact of the Cutts opinion is somewhat ameliorated by the availabil-
ity of a peremptory instruction to the movant. In this procedure the jury is instructed to
find for the movant if it believes the movant's evidence. No such procedure is available
in summary judgment proceedings.
66. Shearin was decided on October 1, 1975. Twice before the end of that year
it was referred to in conjunction with Cutts concerning the propriety of summary judg-
ment for the party having the burden of proof when the credibility of his witnesses is
at issue. See Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Kingsmen Prod., 27 N.C. App. 661, 663, 220
S.E.2d 95, 97 (1975); Alpine Village, Inc. v. Lomas & Nettleton Fiu-Corp., 27 N.C.
App. 403, 405, 219 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1975).
1. Unless otherwise indicated, the following situation is assumed: The owner of
the property finances the project through a lender, for example, a savings and loan
association. The owner contracts with a general contractor to build the building and
agrees to pay him accordingly. The general contractor in turn employs various subcon-
tractors and material suppliers. These subcontractors may similarly employ other
subcontractors and material suppliers. The chain of subcontracts may become quite long
on a major project.
